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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
HARRY W. KIRCHGESTNER, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
-vs.-
THE DENVER AND RIO GRANDE 
WESTERN RAILROAD COM-
pANY, a corporation, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
Case 
No. 7370 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
In this brief we shall designate the parties as they 
appeared in the trial court. 
The appeal by the defendant is from a verdict and 
judgment of $4,300.00 for injuries suffered by plaintiff 
to his back while employed in interstate commerce by 
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the defendant. This is an action under the Federal Em-
ployers' Liability Act. Defendant gave to plaintiff a 
mere $135.00 within ten days after the injuries were 
suffered in settlement for these injuries. Defendant set 
up this release as a bar to the action and plaintiff by his 
reply alleged that the purported release had been en-
tered into under ·a mutual mistake of fact. 
It is to be noted that there are no matters presented 
on this appeal which in any way affect defendant's lia-
bility for its violation of the Safety Appliance Act in 
permitting one of its cars to be operated in interstate 
commerce with a defective grab-iron. The evidence of 
the existence of this defective grab-iron and the fact 
that plaintiff fell and was injured is uncontradicted, and 
although defendant makes some inferences in its brief 
questioning the happening of the accident we will not 
belabour the point but will only answer those things 
which are directly raised by the defendant in its brief. 
It is also to be noted that there is no contention 
m·ade by defendant that the verdict is excessive in this 
case and so it is established that the plaintiff has suf-
fered injuries and damages in the sum of $4,300.00. In 
connection with plaintiff's injuries defendant goes so far 
as to accuse the plaintiff of being a malingerer. How-
ever, this matter was fully ~argued before and determined 
by the jury and under the testimony of Dr. White it 
appears without any question that plaintiff was suffer-
ling at the time of trial from pains in his back which the 
doctor was able to confirm by the existence of a muscle 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
3 
spasn1 (R. 86, 92, 93) and that the plaintiff was not "put-
ting on" (R. 86). 
STATE~IENT OF FACTS 
The Statement of Facts made by the defendant in 
this case is Yery brief and does not disclose in detail the 
testimony and evidence introduced on the matters of 
interest on this appeal. It is therefore necessary that 
we make a more complete statement of the testimony 
introduced in this case. 
The plaintiff testified that in attempting to board 
one of the cars of the train on which he was working 
he took hold of the top rung of the ladder and that the 
rung or grab-iron came loose from the car and he rolled 
down the mountainside about 25 feet. He fell from the 
car backwards. He struck his back against a boulder (R. 
101). The fall stunned him but he got back up and 
mounted the engine (R. 102). He continued to perform 
his duties as brakeman for the balance of the night; he 
thought he was "just kind of shook up and thought that 
was about all there was to it." (R. 103.) His shins were 
skinned. His injuries were received at 8:30 the night 
of June 26, 1948, and he quit work at 11 :50 on that date 
at Salida, Colorado. On the morning of June 27th his 
back started bothering him and he described the condi-
tion as an ache in the small of his back (R. 104). He 
then went down to the Rio Grande Hospital at Salida, 
where he was examined by Dr. Smith and x-rays were 
then taken. Dr. Smith stated that he could find nothing 
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wrong with plaintiff and gave him some little pink pills. 
Plaintiff did not report for work on the 27th of June 
because he didn't feel like it. He at that time believed 
he was just shaken up from the fall (R. 104). About 
three or four days later he was examined by Dr. Hoover 
or Dr. Fuller -at the same hospital in Salida and this 
doctor stated that he thought he would be all right (R. 
105). 
Mr. Merrill, the trainmaster's clerk at Salida sent 
plaintiff to Pueblo to see the defendant's Claim Agent, 
M. V. Sayger. This was on the 6th day of July (R. 107). 
Mr. Sayger had received information from the Train-
master's office at Salida that plaintiff was coming to 
see him. Before plaintiff arrived Mr. Sayger called the 
hospital at Salida and talked with Dr. Fuller. He asked 
the doctor whether or not plaintiff was "physically 
qualified to return to work" and the doctor told him that 
plaintiff was (R. 161). When plaintiff arrived he told 
Mr. Sayger that he had come for a settleiPent of his 
case and that he felt he was able to return to work (R. 
163). There was no discussion as to the extent of his 
injuries other than as could be implied from the fact 
that both plaintiff and the claim agent believed plaintiff 
was ready to go to work and was all right (R. 163). 
There was a conflict in the testimony of Mr. Say-
ger and plaintiff concerning the manner in which the 
$135.00 settlement was arrived at. In view of the jury 
verdict, the testimony should be taken most favorably 
to plaintiff. Plaintiff testified that after asking Sayger 
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to settle up 'Yith him the two sat down and figured up 
the time plaintiff had been off, which was ten days. 
Plaintiff's daily wage was $12.54. Sayger stated that 
would figure about $125.00 and plaintiff stated that he 
would take $135.00, to which Sayger agreed, saying, 
''You drive a hard bargain'' ( R. 181). 
Plaintiff testified that he told Sayger that he felt 
he could go back to work again and Sayger replied 
"Okeh." Plaintiff testified that he believed he could go 
back to work and that his injuries were over and that 
this was the basis upon which he made the settlement 
(R. 182). 
Plaintiff testified that prior to the injury received 
on June 26th his health had been good and he had never 
been bothered with any pain in the area of his back (R. 
140). During the month of July plaintiff was never re-
lieved from the pain in his back. When he went back to 
work in August his back still ached but he figured that 
"it would come out of it all right now" (R. 108). Dur-
ing the time that plaintiff worked in August he stated 
that every night when he would get in off the road the 
pain in the small of his back would bother him severely. 
He had a dull pain all the time but in the mornings when 
he would start to work it did not bother him so much. 
The severity of the pain increased when he got tired. 
He described the pain after working all day as ''sharp, 
shooting pains" (R. 109). He stated that when he was 
not working for the railroad during the last half of 
August that he stayed home and rested up and that this 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
6 
rest helped him (R. 111). He worked again from Sep-
tember 1st to September 26th but during this time he 
still had the dull, aching pain in his back and it seemed 
to remain about the same. He explained that because 
of the pain in his back he doesn't believe he would have 
been able to work unless he had had a good reason for 
it and unless the conductor and other brakeman had per-
formed about half of his work for him (R. 111). 
Plaintiff was off work from the 26th day of Sep-
tember to the 27th of October and he then worked the 
last five days in October and five days in November 
until November 8th (R. 112). 
During this period of time he had consulted with 
Dr. Delahanty and Dr. Hines, the latter of whom had 
prescribed a belt for his back (R. 114-15). The plaintiff 
testified that his back ached continually (R. 116). Plain-
tiff explained that as a brakeman he was required to 
stoop over for the purpose of coupling air hoses and to 
line "dwarf" switches. He testified that this stooping 
over caused pain in his back (R. 119-20). Climbing up 
and down ladders and getting on and off of boxcars also 
increased the pain in his back (R. 121). 
The plaintiff's medical expert, Dr. White, could 
only find one place in his back that appeared to have 
any arthritic condition and stated that this was above 
the point where the plaintiff's pain was located (R. 79-
80). However, the defendant's doctor, Dr. C. R. Fullel", 
testified that from his examination and the x-rays which 
he took it appeared that plaintiff had osteo-arthritis of 
< 
I 
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all the vertebrae of his back (R. 171). Plaintiff's docto-:.· 
testified that an injury to the bark might aggravate the 
arthritic condition if any existed there and that the 
healing process would probably be slower (R. 81). 
The foregoing statement of facts presents the testi-
mony in more detail than is contained in defendant's 
brief and as we proceed with the argument we shall 
quote from various material portions of the record. 
SU~IMARY OF ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE EVIDENCE CONCLUSIVELY ESTABLISHED 
THAT THE RELEASE WAS ENTERED INTO BECAUSE 
OF A MUTUAL MISTAKE OF FACT AND THE VERDICT 
VOIDING THE RELEASE AS A BAR TO THIS ACTION IS 
SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE. 
POINT II. 
THERE WAS NO ERROR IN THE COURT'S INSTRUC-
TION THAT THE BURDEN OF PROOF WAS UPON PLAIN-
TIFF TO PROVE BY A PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVI-
DENCE THAT THE PARTIES ENTERED INTO THE RE-
LEASE UNDER A MUTUAL MISTAKE OF FACT. 
POINT III. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT ERROR IN 
GIVING ITS INSTRUCTION NO. 10. 
POINT IV. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN INSTRUCTING 
THE JURY THAT PLAINTIFF WAS ENTITLED TO COM-
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PENSATION FOR ALL PAIN AND SUFFERING THAT HE 
WOULD PROBABLY ENDURE IN THE FUTURE. 
POINT V. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN PERMITTING 
PLAINTIFF TO TESTIFY ro TREATMENT PRESCRIBED 
BY DR. HINES. 
POINT VI. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN PERMITTING 
PLAINTIFF TO TESTIFY TO DIRECTIONS GIVEN HIM 
BY DEFENDANT'S TRAINMASTER'S CLERK, MERRILL. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE EVIDENCE CONCLUSIVELY ESTABLISHED 
THAT THE RELEASE WAS ENTERED INTO BECAUSE 
OF A MUTUAL MISTAKE OF FACT AND THE VERDIC'r 
VOIDING THE RELEASE AS A BAR TO THIS ACTION IS 
SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE. 
Defendant by its answer pleaded a release for 
$135.00 as a bar to plaintiff's action. Plaintiff in his 
reply alleged that the release had been entered into under 
a mutual mistake of the parties. Defendant has at no 
time until this present appeal raised the question of the 
sufficiency of the plaintiff's reply. Facts sufficient to 
avoid the release are therein alleged. Evidence relating 
to the execution of the release and the issues of mutual 
mistake were introduced in evidence without objection 
of either side. The matter was fully presented to the 
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court and jury. The defendant requested an instruction 
setting forth its views of the law relating to the avoid-
ance of the relea~e by mutual n1istake (See Defendant's 
Requested Instruction No. 2, R. 34). This instruction 
was adopted by the Court and given as the Court's In-
struction :No. 6 (R. 39), and to which no exception was 
taken. The only change made was that relating to the 
degree of proof which forms the basis of defendant'~ 
second point in its brief, and which will be answered 
hereafter. The Court's Instruction No. 6, as requested 
by the defendant, with that one exception, is as follows 
(R. 39): 
"No. 6 
"It is admitted that the plaintiff in considera-
tion of the sum of One Hundred Thirty-five Dol-
lars ($135.00) paid to him by the defendant exe-
cuted and delivered to the defendant a written 
release by the terms of which the plaintiff re--
leased and discharged the defendant from all 
liability on account of the accident and injuries 
described in the plaintiff's complaint in this ac-
tion. You are, therefore, instructed that the bur-
den rests upon the plaintiff to prove by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence that this release was 
executed under the belief of both plaintiff and 
defendant that the plaintiff had recovered from 
the injuries sustained by him in said accident and 
that both he and the defendant were mistaken in 
such belief. Unless the plaintiff has sustained this 
burden your verdict must be in favor of the de-
fendant." 
We submit that this instruction was a correct state-
ment of the law in its application to the issues of this 
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case. We believe it conforms to the rule adopted by th~ 
Federal courts, a brief statement of which is found in 
the case of Callen v. Pennsylvania Railroad Company, 
332 U. S. 625, 68 S. Ct. 296, wherein the Court states: 
"* * * One who attacks a settlement must bear 
the burden of showing that the contract he has 
made is tainted with invalidity, either by fraud 
practiced upon him or by a mutual mistake under 
which both parties acted. '' 
See also Scheer v. Rockne Motors Corp., 68 F. 2d 
942; St.eele v. Eriie R. Co., 54 F. 2d 688, 54 F. 2d 690 
(Cert. den.) 285 U.S. 546. 
There can be no dispute that this instruction con-
stitutes the ·law of the case and certainly where defend-
ant's request on the subject is given and no exception is 
taken to the giving of such instruction, defendant can-
not now claim the law is different than that expressed in 
the instruction. We submit that under the testimony no 
other verdict could have been rendered on the issue of 
mutual mistake than a verdict in favor of plaintiff. If 
the release was executed under the belief of both plain-
tiff and defendant that the plaintiff had recovered from 
the injuries sustained and they both were mistaken in 
that belief, the release should then be set aside and the 
verdict is supported by the evidence. 
Plaintiff does not claim that there was any fraud 
attached to the execution of this release but does claim 
that both parties on the 6th day of July believed that 
the plaintiff's injuries were such that he could return to 
J 
t 
1 
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work at that tiine and that his injuries would no Ionge r 
prevent hin1 from discharging his duties as a brakeman. 
As indicated in the statement of facts, plaintiff was sent 
to Pueblo to see defendant's claim agent. He had at 
that time been off work for ten days. Plaintiff's own 
testimony on the occasion of the execution of this re-
lease is as follows (R. 181-82): 
"A. I went in and introduced myself to Mr. 
Sayger, right in the Pueblo depot down where 
his office is. 
Q. What did he say~ 
A. He said, 'I am glad to know you'. Ack-
nowledged the introduction. And I said, 'Well, 
Mr. Sayger, how about settling up with me~' 
He said, 'Well, let's see what we can do.' 
So we figured up day for day. 
MR. BAGLEY: Just a moment. Tell us how 
you figured, how you went about it. What was 
said, just as near as you can. 
A. Well, the rate of pay, I believe, is twelve 
dollars and something a day. Twelve dollars and 
something a day. Twelve fifty-four, I believe it 
is, somewhere around there. 
Mr. Sayger said, 'Well, that would figure you 
about $125.00, wouldn't it~' 
I s:aid, 'I will take one hundred thirty-five.' 
And that was all there was to it. 
Q. What did he say~ 
A. He said, 'You drive a hard bargain.' 
Q. Was anything else said~ 
A. No sir. He wrote me out a check. I went 
and cashed it and went on to Denver. 
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Q. Was :anything said concerning you going 
back to work 
A. No, not that I recall. He asked me how I 
felt. I said, 'I feel like I could go back to work 
again'. And he said, 'Okeh '. 
Q. Did you believe you could go back to 
work~ 
A. I did. 
Q. Did you feel that your injuries were overT 
A. I did. 
Q. Is that the basis upon which you made 
that settlement~ 
A. That is right." 
The defendant's Claim Agent, M. V. Sayger, testi-
fied that he had learned from the Trainmaster's office 
at Salida that plaintiff was coming to see him. In 
preparation for this visit he had called Dr. Fuller and 
in this connection Sayger testified (R. 161-62): 
'' Q. And had you received any information 
as to the extent ·of his injuries? 
A. I knew nothing about his injuries, except 
I had asked the doctor, after I received word 
that he was coming, if he was physically quali-
fied to return to work, and was informed that he 
was. 
Q. When was it that you received this in-
formation 1 
A. In the forenoon. 
Q. That he was coming? 
j 
( 
I 
l 
I 
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A. Of the day he arrived. 
Q. That would be the forenoon of the 6th 
of July~ 
A. That is right. 
Q. And you called what Doctor~ 
A. Dr. Fuller. 
Q. Dr. Fuller. And he Is at the hospital 
where~ 
A. Salida. 
Q. And you asked him concerning any injur-
ies that nfr. Kirchgestner, that the plaintiff was 
suffering from~ 
A. No. I merely asked him if Mr. Kirch-
gestner was able to return to duty. 
Q. And he told you that he was~ 
A. That is right." 
Regarding the information which he had at the time 
of settlement, Sayger testified as follows (R. 162): 
'' Q. And then all the information you had 
before the plaintiff arrived, was that he was an 
individual who had been in some way entitled to 
some compensation from the railroad, and who 
was now in physical condition that -he could re-
turn to work~ 
A. That is !ight." 
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Sayger knew that plaintiff was making the settle-
ment under the belief that he was all right and ready 
to go to work. In this regard he testified (R. 163): 
"Q. And he told you, at that time, that he 
was all over them, and everything was all right 
with him~ 
A. He said he felt he was able to return to 
work, but he wanted to go to Denver, then back 
to Salida, and he would be ready to go to work, 
his home being in Denver. 
* * * * * 
Q. Did you discuss his injuries with him? 
A. Nothing any further than asked his con-
dition, if he was able to return to work. 
Q. He said he was all right Y 
A. He said he was all right. 
Q. And ready to go to work? 
A. That is right." 
We submit that the foregoing testimony is conclu-
sive that both defendant's agent Sayger and the plain-
tiff made this settlement upon the belief that plaintiff's 
injuries were at an end and that he was able at that time 
to return to work. The evidence conclusively establishes 
that plaintiff continued to suffer from the injuries he 
had received on June 26th until the time of trial. The 
night before the date of trial plaintiff was examined 
by Dr. White (R. 76). The doctor found that plaintiff 
did have pain in the region of the lumbar sacral junc-
tion, both on pressure and movement (R. 77). 
' 
J ) 
I 
I 
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On cross-examination defendant's counsel attempted 
to get the doctor to testify that the doctor had relied 
entirely upon what the plaintiff told him in determining 
whether or not pain was present. The doctor, however, 
stated that from his examination he did not believe that 
plaintiff was faking pain, and testified that he found a 
muscle spasm in the area of the lumbar region of the 
back (R. 85). The doctor testified (R. 86): 
"Q. But in the case of Mr. Kirchgestner, you 
couldn't tell whether that muscle spasm was vol-
untary or involuntary, could you~ 
A. Well, I would say that he impressed me, 
during his examination-
Q. All right. 
A. As being very cooperative, and not trying 
to fool me, like some of them have tried in the 
past, which usually they don't. But he was co-
operative, and I don't believe that he was putting 
on. 
Q. He didn't have anything the matter with 
him, did he! 
A. Oh, I wouldn't say that. He had some 
muscle spasm in his back which is giving him 
pain.'' 
In describing the location of the pain, the doctor 
testified (R. 89) : 
"Q. I believe I asked you, Doctor, but you 
ascribed this pain to a region lower than the re-
gion of this arthritis, did you not~ 
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A. That is where his muscle spasm is, is one 
vertebra lower, :and on the lower portion of it. 
Q. Yes. It is not in the vertebra where the 
arthritic condition exists 1 
A. Not when you palpate him and manipu-
late him, that isn't where he complains of it." ( 
He further testified (R. 92, 93): 
'' Q. And, of course, there is nothing in that 
examination of the lower part of the back, the 
muscle of that back, that would necessarily have 
caused this man any pain, is there~ 
A. Yes. Yes, I am afraid there is. When-
ever we find muscle spasm, which we do find in 
his lower back, it is evidence that they are trying 
to guard something, voluntarily or involuntarily, 
and that is usually accepted as evidence of a pain-
ful condition in that region." 
The doctor stated that plaintiff's pain was in the 
region of the lumbosacral joint, i.e., the fifth lumbar and 
first sacrum. He testified (R. 94): 
'' Q. You didn't find any evidence of any in-
jury to the muscle, or to the tissue, either, did 
you1 
A. Yes, I did. '' 
On recross-examination the doctor stated (R. 94, 
95): 
"Q. Do you feel that that muscle spasm indi-
cated any pain that would prevent him from 
working, carrying ori his duties as a brakeman 1 
I 
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A. Had this been a priYate case of mine, I 
would haYe recommended conservative treatment 
with some physiotherapy. In other words, not 
having worked for maybe a matter of another two 
or three months, during which time he would 
have had that treatment; and I personally think 
that would have been almost sufficient to help 
him a lot so that he could have ''rorked. But he 
hasn't had any of that treatment, from the story 
he gives me, from October, anyway. 
Q. Are you trying to answer my question, 
Dr. White~ 
A. May I hear it again, please. 
MR. BAGLEY: Will you read it to him? 
(Reporter read last question.) 
A. I would have to say yes." 
As already indicated in the statement of facts 
plaintiff testified that he has suffered with a dull ache 
in his back ever since the injury and that in the dis-
charge of his duties as a brakeman he was required to 
stoop and to climb on and off cars and that this cause<i 
pain in his back which became more severe the longer 
he worked. He testified that he would have been unable 
to perform the duties of a brakeman had he not had 
the help of the men on the crew. 
We submit that the foregoing testimony clearly 
establishes that both the plaintiff and defendant were 
mistaken when they concluded that plaintiff was all right 
and was ready to return to work at the time the release 
was signed and executed. 
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Defendant, for the first time in all of these proceed-
ings, contends on appeal that it was incumbent upon 
plaintiff to tender defendant the $135.00 before he could 
attack the validity of the release. At the close of the 
case the defendant made a motion for a directed verdict, 
basing that motion upon seven grounds. Each one of 
the grounds related to the release. In no place did the 
defendant in that motion mention the subject of tender, 
its necessity or the fact that plaintiff had failed to mak~ 
a tender of the $135.00. Plaintiff's view on the law of 
the avoidance of a release was given by the Court in 
its Instruction No. 6. No statement or requirement was 
therein set forth that plaintiff was under the necessity 
of making a tender of the money paid to him pursuant 
to the terms of the release. Defendant asserted the 
validity of the release in its Answer and attempted to 
uphold its validity at every stage of these proceedings. 
We cannot help but wonder at defendant's good faith in 
now stating a tender should have been made. For what 
purpose? Merely for the purpose of permitting the de-
fendant to refuse that tender~ This Court certainly will 
not at this late date in these proceedings say that the 
verdict of the jury must be reversed so that plaintiff 
may perform the useless task of tendering to defendant 
the sum of $135.00, which will certainly be rejected by 
the defendant. This is merely a technicality grabbed at 
by the defendant to save itself from the effects of a 
lost cause. 
The courts have had something to say on this matter 
of tender and we believe that the cases clearly establish 
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that defendant's position is absolutely untenable. The 
courts have held that a defendant by its conduct in 
asserting the right to hold plaintiff to his purported 
bargain clearly shows an attitude that a tender would 
be useless. The law does not require the doing of a 
useless act. 1.11 errill v. Pike, 94 Minn. 186, 102 N. W. 393: 
Girard v. St. Louis Car Wheel Co., 123 Mo. 358, 27 S. W. 
648, 25 L.R.A. 514, 45 Am. St. Rep. 556; St. Louis & S. F. 
R. Co. v. Richards, 23 Okla. 256, 102 P. 92, 23 L.R.A., 
N.S., 1032; Woods v. ~Wikstrom, 67 Ore. 581, 135 P. 192; 
Franklin v .. Webber, 93 Ore. 151, 182 P. 819. 
In Girard v. St. Louis Car Wheel Co., supra, the 
court labeled a contention similar to the one made by 
defendant here as a "sheer technicality." 
In St. Louis & 8. F. R. Co. v. Richards, supra, the 
court branded the requirement of a tender under facts 
similar to those in the case at bar as an "empty, vain 
ceremony.'' 
In Franklin v. Webber, supra, where the jury had 
determined the issue of fraud in the procurement of the 
release in favor of plaintiff, the court held that it would 
be a profitless proceeding to return the case for a new 
trial in order that defendant might have an opportunity 
of refusing a tender of the consideration paid for the 
release. 
In Woods v .. Wikstrom, supra, the court stated (pp. 
199-200 of 135 P.) : 
"It is certain from the pleadings and the evi-
dence in this case that if the plaintiff had ten-
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dered to the defendant the $30, either before or 
after he begun this action, the defendant would 
have refused to accept it. l-Ie obtained said re-
lease to be used as a defense to any action that 
the plaintiff might bring for damages, and he 
pleaded it as a separate defense, and relied on it 
as a defense throughout the trial in the court 
below. If the plaintiff had actually offered him 
said sum as a tender, and he had accepted it as 
such, said offer and the acceptance thereof would 
have operated as a rescission of said release, and 
he could not then have relied on the releas·e as a 
defense. To tender him the $30, therefore, would 
have been a vain thing, as manifestly, the offer 
would have been rejected.'' 
The courts have also held that a failure to raise the 
lack of tender in the trial court precludes the overthrow 
of the verdict in the appellate court. Robertson v. F'ldler 
Constr. Co., 115 Mo. App. 456, 92 S. W. 130; Mandeville 
v. Jacobson, 122 Conn. 429, 189 Atl. 596. 
The Court in the latter case stated: 
'' * • * It is unnecessary to determine in the 
instant case whether an allegation of tender was 
required and the effect of the :absence of such an 
allegation. As we have pointed out, the pleadings 
did not raise any such question and, as far as 
appears, no such point was raised at the trial and 
there were no requests to charge m:ade of the 
court. 'If a reply of fraud is made to a plea of 
release, and no objection is at any time, by plead-
ing or otherwise, made to the sufficiency of the 
plaintiff's case for failure to tender or return 
the fruits of such release, and the defendant in-
sists on its validity :as a defense, he thereby waives 
I ) 
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the necessity for a tender, especially when the 
fruits of a release are restored to him by the 
judgment and there is no prejudicial error in the 
omission to allege or prove an offer to retur:1 
those benefits, even if such offer were otherwise 
necessary to avoid the release.' 23 RCL 415; 
Girard v. St. Louis Car Wheel Co. (1894) 123 :Mo. 
358, 27 S.\Y. ·648, 25 LRA 514, 517, 45 Am. St. Rep. 
556 (supra). The charge as given was adapted to 
the issues raised by the pleadings and sufficient 
for the guidance of the jury, and the trial court 
was not bound to instruct the jury as to a possible 
defense which was not raised by the pleadings or 
otherwise claimed at the trial.'' 
The courts have unanimously agreed that the de-
fendant's rights are fully protected where deduction of 
the consideration for the release is made and that no 
reversible error is committed under such circumstances. 
Franklin v. Webber, 93 Ore. 151, 182 P. 819; Marple v. 
Minneapolis. <I; St. L. R. Co., 115 Minn. 262, 132 N. W. 
333, Ann. Cas. 1912D 1082; Malmstrom v .. Northern P. R. 
Co., 20 Wash. 195, 55 P. 38. 
In Franklin v. Webber, supra, the court stated (p'. 
822 of 182 P.): 
'' * * * it is unnecessary to return or tender 
the consideration paid for a release obtained by 
fraud as a requisite of the maintenance of an 
action for damages resulting from a personal in-
jury, since it is sufficient if the amount received 
upon the release is deducted from the verdict if 
one ·is obtained. * * *'' 
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In Marple v·. Minneapolis & St. Louis R. Co., supra, 
the Court stated: 
'' * * * There are many cases in other states 
which hold to the doctrine that substantial jus-
tice is secured and the spirit of the rule followed 
where no return or offer to return is made in the 
pleadings, but where the money received on the 
settlement is deducted from the amount of the 
recovery, in case there be a recovery for a greater 
sum. Some cases hold this on the ground that 
where plaintiff was entitled to the money irrespec-
tive of the contract, it is inequitable that he should 
be required to pay it back as a condition of rescis-
sion; others, on the ground that equity will not 
compel the doing of a useless act, and will not 
permit a mere technicality to defeat justice. But 
the real ground of all the cases, we think, is that 
there is no reason for the strict application of 
the rule when substantial justice can be meted out 
in the final disposition of the case. * * * It is not 
strictly logical to say that plaintiff was entitled 
to retain the money paid because it was due him 
by virtue of the original liability, because the 
question of defendant's liability was not then 
determined. But we are of the opinion, and so 
hold, that it was not necessary for plaintiff to do 
a useless act, that all that is required by equity is 
that substantial justice be done, that this is done 
when the amount received on the settlement is 
credited on the verdict, and that it would be a 
profitless proceeding to send this case back for a 
new trial in order that defendant may have an 
opportunity to refuse an offer of plaintiff to re-
turn the money received. The offer is nothing. 
It is the actual return of the money received that 
is the material thing. This has been done by the 
verdict. * * * '' 
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Defendant also argues that the mutual mistake even 
if proven played no part in the for1nation of the contract 
embodied in the release. "\Y e are at a loss to understand 
how defendant can argue any such proposition. It con-
clusiv·ely appears that the plaintiff and defendant's claim 
agent believed that plaintiff was able to return to work 
and that he was all right. Certainly a question of fact 
was presented to the jury by the evidence above quoted 
and upon which the jury could determine that the par-
ties to this release would not have settled an injury 
worth $4,300.00 for $135.00. 
We submit that under the evidence above indiqated 
and upon the authorities herein cited that there was 
conclusive evidence in the record to support the jury's 
finding that the release was entered into under a mutual 
mistake of fact and for that reason it should be held not 
to bar the plaintiff's action. 
POINT II. 
THERE WAS NO ERROR IN THE COURT'S INSTRUC-
TION THAT THE BURDEN OF PROOF WAS UPON PLAIN-
TIFF TO PROVE BY A PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVI-
DENCE THAT THE PARTIES ENTERED INTO THE RE-
LEASE UNDER A MUTUAL MISTAKE OF FACT. 
Defendant, in its request on the subject of avoid-
ance of the release, asked the court to instruct the jury 
that the plaintiff had the burden of establishing mutual 
mistake of fact by clear and convincing evidence. The 
court struck out this requirement and instructed the 
jury that the burden was upon plaintiff to prove the 
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mutual mistake of fact by a preponderance of the evi-
dence. Defendant cites cases under this point of his 
brief wherein the courts have stated that the degree of 
proof in such cases is clear and convincing evidence. 
However, none of those cases were cases in which in-
structions to the jury were considered. We have been 
unable to find any case which holds that an instruction 
requiring plaintiff to prove his case by a preponderance 
of the evidence in a case such as the one at bar consti-
tutes error, let alone prejudicial error. 
In the case of Chicago &; N. W. Ry .. Co. v. Wilcox, 
116 Fed. 913, the action was one in equity to set aside 
the release and the court was not considering an in-
struction. 
In the other two cases cited by defendant, Merwin 
v. N. Y., N. H. &; H. R. Co., 62 F. (2d) 803, and Callen v. 
Pennsylvania Railroad Co., 162 F. (2d) 832, the courts 
did not consider the giving of an instruction on the de-
gree of proof and hence are not in point for the conten-
tion now made by the defendant. 
A case in point, which sustains the action of the 
trial judge in so instructing the jury, is the case of 
Kansas City Southern Ry. Go. v. Sanford, 182 Ark. 484, 
31 S. W. 2d 963, 966 (Writ of Certiorari denied in 283 
U. S. 825, 75 L. Ed. 1439, 51 S. Ct. 3~7). That case was 
an action under the Federal Employers' Liability Act 
to recover for personal injuries suffered by a railroad em-
I 
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ployee. The railroad relied upon a release to defeat 
plaintiff's cause of action. The Court stated: 
''The court submitted the foregoing question 
to the jury under proper instructions, but on the 
degree of proof required gave the following in-
struction: 'The jury are instructed that if they 
find that the settlement entered into between the 
plaintiff and defendant was not based upon raise 
misrepresentation or mutual mistake, you will 
find for the defendant, and the burden devolves 
upon the plaintiff to prove by a preponderance of 
the evidence that such misrepresentations were 
made or mutual mistake existed.' The appellant 
earnestly insists that the giving of this instruc-
tion was error in that it authorized a verdict for 
the plaintiff on a bare preponderance of the evi-
dence, and that in this kind of a case it was not 
sufficient for the plaintiff to establish his case by 
mere preponderance of the evidence, but that the 
jury should have been instructed that the burden 
was upon the plaintiff to establish its allegations 
of fraud or mistake 'by evidence clear, cogent 
and convincing,' and relies upon the case of Chi-
cago, etc., Ry. Co. v. Wilcox (C.C.A.) 116 F. 
913, and the case of Wallace v. Skinner, 15 Wyo. 
233, 88 P. 221, to support its contention. 
"It will be noted that the first-named case 
was a suit in equity to cancel a written release, 
and in that case the court held that a release 
might not be rescinded for fraud or mistake 
unless the evidence of fraud or mistake is clear, 
unequivocal, and convincing. This is likewise 
our rule in equity cases where fraud or mistake 
is pleaded and affirmative relief sought. Ogle-
tree v. Smith, 176 Ark. 597, 3 S.W. (2d) 683. 
But the instant case is a suit at law and the aile-
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gation of fraud or mistake is defensive only, 
no cancellation of the written instrument being 
asked, but its consequence merely sought to be 
avoided. The Wyoming case, supra, was an action 
at law for a recovery of damages, and the de-
fense of fraud or mistake was offered in avoid-
ance of a release pleaded in bar to the cause of 
action. In that case the court laid down the 
clear perponderance rule, but we have been un-
able to find any support for this case, but think 
the weight of authority and the decisions of 
our own court are to the contrary. This view 
is supported by the case of Capital Traction Co. 
v. Sneed, 58 App. D. C. 141, 26 F. (~d) 296, page 
303; Lumley v. Wabash Ry. Co. (C.C.A.) 76 
F. 66; St. L., I. M. & S. R. Co.v. Phillips (C.C.A.) 
66 F. 35, while in this state the mere perpon-
derance rule has been uniformly given to juries 
without any question raised and considered by 
this court without criticism, and tacitly approved. 
Industrial Mut. Indemnity Co. v. Thompson, 83 
Ark. 575, 582, 104 S. W. 200, 10 L.R.A. (N.S.) 
1064, 119 Am. St. Rep. 149; St. L., I. M. & S. Ry. 
Co. v. Hambright, 87 Ark. 614, 113 S. W. 803; 
St. L., I. M. & S. R. Co. v. Carter, 93 Ark. 589, 
594, 126 S. W. 99; F. Kiech Mfg. Co. v. James, 
164 Ark. 137, 142, 2,61 S. W. 24; St. L. S. F. Co. 
v. Cox, 171 Ark. 103, 283 S. W. 31; Sun Oil Co. 
v. Hedge, 173 Ark. 729, 293 S. W. 9. 
''In the case of Rice-Stix Dry Goods Co. v. 
Montgomery, 164 Ark. 161, 261 S. W. 325, 329, the 
issue was whether the maker of the note sued 
on was induced to execute the same through 
fraud and misrepresentation. In that case it 
was argued that the burden of proof was on the 
maker the same as if he was asking in equity to 
rescind his contract and cancel the note. A num-
ber of cases were cited to sustain that view. 
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In referring to those cases this court said : 'But 
the rule in these cases, to wit, that before equity 
will cancel, set aside, or reform a deed or instru-
ment for fraud, the proof of the alleged fraud 
must be clear, convincing, and unequivocal, has 
no application to actions like this at law. Here 
no affirmative relief of cancellation or reforma-
tion of an instrument is sought, but the defense is 
simply that of nonliability because of deceit and 
fraud in procuring the instrument which is the 
foundation of the action. While fraud at law, 
as well as in equity, is never to be presumed and 
must be proved yet in actions at law one who has 
the burden of proof to establish fraud meets 
the requirements of the rule when he proves 
the fraud only by a perponderance of the evi-
dence.' " 
The courts of Iowa have also held that it is unneces-
sary to instruct a jury in a civil case that a party must 
prove a proposition by clear and convincing evidence. 
In other words, such courts have held that the rule 
which prevails in equity is not applicable to trials by 
jury. See Holt v. Brown, 63 Ia. 319, 19 N. W. 235; Mc-
Anulty v. Seiok, 59 Ia. 586, 13 N. W. 743. 
In Holt v. Brown, supra, the court stated: 
"••*But it has been held that the rule which 
prevails in equity is not applicable to trials 
by jury • * *. In such actions the rule is that 
the issue must be determined by a perponderance 
of the evidence.'' 
We submit that instructing a jury that the evidence 
must be clear and convincing would mean little or noth-
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ing to the jury. We have been unable to find any cases 
where a failure or refusal to instruct on such degree of 
proof has been held error. 
The Utah court in Picino v. Utah-Apex Mining Co. 
et al., 52 Utah 338, 173 Pac. 900, has indicated a ten-
dency to place all civil matters upon a common basis 
and all issues in a civil case should be presented to a 
jury under instructions requiring the parties to prove 
their respective contentions by a preponderance of the 
evidence. 
In any event we submit that the evidence established 
without contradiction that the parties were laboring 
under a mutual mistake of fact on the proposition of 
whether or not the plaintiff was physically able to return 
to work and as to the fact that plaintiff had recovered 
from the effects of any injuries suffered by him on 
June 26th. We refer to the discussion of the evidence 
as set forth under Point I of this brief. 
We submit that the defendant could not possibly 
have been prejudiced even if error were present in this 
instruction. 
POINT III. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT ERROR IN 
GIVING ITS INSTRUCTION NO. 10. 
Instruction No. 10 is quoted at length on page 21 
of appellant's brief. By that instruction the jury was 
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told that plaintiff was entitled to all damages, if any, 
resulting from the defective grab-iron, even though his 
injuries were more serious and of longer duration be-
cause of the preexisting arthritis to which the defend-
ant's medical expert testified. 
Defendant's criticism of this instruction is unrealis-
tic. It claims that it concerns a subject upon which there 
was no evidence and about which there was no issue. 
Plaintiff had been in good health and had suffered no 
back pains prior to his injury on June 26th. Since that 
time he has continually been bothered with such pains, 
the severity of which increased with stooping and 
climbing off and on cars and when he becomes tired from 
work. Plaintiff's medical expert testified that he found 
evidence of arthritis on only one vertebra, that being 
the fourth lumbar vertebra. His testimony in that re-
gard is found at R. 79 and 80, wherein he testified: 
"Now, the only thing that we notice abnormal 
here is that on the top of this 4th lumbar verte-
bra there is a little bit of roughening. For in-
stance, compare it with this 3rd lumbar vertabra, 
and you see this is a little rough here, and a 
little rounded at that end. That is evidence of 
an osteo-arthritis involving his 4th lumbar verte-
bra. However, most of his pain is down a little 
bit lower than that, which makes you think it 
is soft tissue injury rather than bony injury 
that is giving him his pain.'' 
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Plaintiff's expert was then asked concerning the 
effect which arthritis might have upon an injury and 
he testified (R. 81): 
'' Q. In your opinion, Doctor, could a con-
dition of arthritis such as you observed in the 
exhibits here, have been caused or created by 
a blow in the nature of a fall in which a man 
lands on his back~ 
A. Well, these pictures were taken in October, 
and my recollection was his injury was in June. I 
wouldn't want to go on record as saying that 
would cause an ·arthritic process to develop in 
that length of time. He may have had an arth-
ritic process that was aggravated by his injury, 
but to say the injury itself caused the arthritis, 
I wouldn't want to say that. 
Q. What effect does the presence of arth-
ritis in a person's spine have on injury, or is 
there a relationship there~ 
A. If a person with arthritis was injured, 
he would probably be a little slower ~. gett~g 
better; it might aggravate the arthritic thm~ 
so it would develop to a greater degree than It 
would otherwise.'' 
Under the foregoing testimony when plaintiff rested 
his case there had not been raised an issue as to the 
effect that arthritis might have upon the injuries and 
damage sustained by plaintiff. However, the defendant 
in its case then introduced testimony through its medical 
expert that the plaintiff's back was filled with arthritis. 
We pause to ask the question, If defendant contended 
nothing for this arthritic condition, why then did it in-
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troduce such testimony in this case 1 The obvious answer 
is that defendant used this testimony for the purpo3e 
of attempting to impress on the jury both by evidence 
and by argument that any trouble that plaintiff was 
experiencing did not result from any injury suffered by 
him. Defendant contended that if plaintiff suffered any 
pain in his back it was due to an arthritic condition which 
had been in existence for at least ten years prior to the 
accident of June 26th. Defendant's medical expert had 
examined the plaintiff at the hospital in Salida on July 
5, 1948 and had taken x-rays of plaintiff's back. He tes-
ti:fied as follows (R. 171, 172): 
'' Q. Will you explain to the jurors anything 
unusual or abnormal about that spine, that you 
can observe? 
A. Well, yes sir. He has osteo-arthritis of 
all of the vertabrae, including the lower dorsal 
and all of the lumbar. 
* * • * * * * 
''Q. The arthritic condition you have pointed 
to, on the different vertabrae is toward the front, 
is it not? 
A. Yes sir. This is towards the abdomen, to-
wards the front. 
Q. Do you notice any arthritic condition at 
the surface of the spine as it surfaces near the 
back? 
A. You have this lipping of the body of the 
vertebrae. You notice arthritic changes. 
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Q. When you say 'the lipping', are you indi-
cating the little points that grow out on the ver-
tebrae~ 
A. No. These are the points. That is the 
front surface. This is on the body of the verte-
brae where, in between here, you have your pad 
of cartilage. The lipping of this also so denotes 
arthritis. 
Q. In other words, there is an arthritic con-
dition along that entire back~ 
A. Yes sir. 
Q. In the area you have indicated~ 
A. Yes.'' 
This doctor testified that the fifth lumbar vertebra was 
affected with arthritis (R. 174). 
The defendant was very careful to point out that 
this arthritic condition found in plaintiff's back was a 
condition which had been present for a long period of 
time. The doctor testified as follows (R. 175): 
'' Q. I believe, Doctor, he was injured on the 
26th of June, or claims to have been injured on 
the 26th of June, which would be approximately 
a little over a week before? 
A. Yes sir. 
,Q. Would you say this arthritic condition 
W~ICh you d~monstrated to the jurors existed 
prior to the time he claimed he was injured~ 
A. Sure. 
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how far before he was injured this condition 
existed? 
A. Of course, I can't make an absolute state-
ment on that. I presllllle it started ten years, at 
least, before. That would be the supposition. 
Q. In other words, Doctor, the condition you 
have demonstrated to us in these x-rays is a con-
dition which has grown in this man, and existed 
probably ten years prior to the time he claims his 
injuries t 
A. Yes sir." 
This medical expert also testified that he had come to 
the conclusion that there was no injury to the bones of 
the spine or to the lower back, and the doctor to bolster 
his testimony told of a series of studies that were made 
of backs of individuals coming in before him for exami-
nation. This study was made because of the numerous 
complaints of low back pains of individuals. He testi-
fied that while he wouldn't say that the average person 
over forty had back pains there were an awful lot of 
them that did (R. 176, 177). 
The effect of defendant's testimony was that there 
was no injury to plaintiff's back and nothing wrong 
with it other than an arthritic condition which had 
existed for at least ten years. From this testimony de-
fendant was able to argue and did argue that any pain 
suffered by plaintiff was related solely to a back condi-
tion which had existed for a long time prior to the in-
juri~s of June 26th. This testimony, however, also had 
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the effect of placing before the jury the proposition 0f 
whether or not the arthritic condition and resulting pain 
had been caused or aggravated by the fall suffered by 
plaintiff. Because of the arthritic condition existing in 
the back the jury could well have believed and deter-
mined that plaintiff's injury was of longer duration 
than it otherwise would have been. Such conclusion anJ. 
determination is justified by the testimony of Dr. White 
above quoted to the effect that an arthritic condition 
would probably result in slower healing. 
The cases cited by the defendant under Point III 
of its brief have nothing to do with the situation pre-
sented in the case at bar. They merely stand for the 
general principle that it is error to submit an issue on 
which there is no evidence. 
In Tyng v. Constant Lorraine Investment Co., 37 
Utah 304, 108 Pac. 1109, and in State Bank of Beaver 
Cownty v. Hollingshead, 82 Utah 416, 25 P. (2d) 612, the 
courts had before them actions soundmg in contract. 
In Railroad Company v. Houston, 95 U. S. 697, and 
in Erie Railroad Co. v. Vajo, 41 F. · (2d) 738, the in-
structions were on the question of liabiilty in negligence 
cases. 
The defendant is in error when it states that there 
was no issue made by the pleadings relative to an aggra-
vation of a preexisting latent osteo-arthritic condition 
of the back. In describing the injuries suffered by plain-
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tiff due to the fall, in paragraph VIII, Subdiv. (b), 
found at R. 3, plaintiff's complaint alleges: 
'' (b) Severe shock and injury to the nervous 
system, activating and aggravating a latent osteo-
arthritic condition of the back, hips, lumbar and 
sacroiliac joints." 
We submit that there was no error in instructing 
the jucy that aggravation of a preexisting condition is 
recoverable. Such aggravation could consist of either 
greater pain or pain existing over a longer period of 
time. 
POINT IV. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN INSTRUCTING 
THE JURY THAT PLAINTIFF WAS ENTITLED TO COM-
PENSATION FOR ALL PAIN AND SUFFERING THAT HE 
WOULD PROBABLY ENDURE IN THE FUTURE. 
Defendant, under Point IV of its brief, contends 
that the jury should have been instructed that plaintiff 
was entitled to recover damages for only such future 
pain and suffering as the evidence establishes with 
reasonable certainty. 
Defendant relies primarily upon the case of Chicago, 
M. & St. P .. Ry. Co. v. Lindeman, 143 Fed. 946. This 
case is distinguishable from the case at bar in that the 
jury here was instructed that it could allow for only 
such pain and suffering as plaintiff "will probably en-
dure in the future." There was no such language con-
tained in the instruction considered in the Lindeman 
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case. There plaintiff was permitted to recover for pain 
and suffering he "may in the future suffer." 
The rule for future losses under the Federal Em-
ployers' Liability Act was raised in a much later case 
in the United States Supreme Court, i.e., Chesapeake & 
Ohio Ry. Co. v. Carnaham,, 241 U.S. 241, 36 S. Ct. 594,595. 
The second assignment of error by the railroad was that 
the instruction complained of permitted a recovery in 
damages not only for those that proximately resulted 
from the injury, but also its effect upon the future which 
involved a consideration of consequences which might 
be essentially speculative and remote. The court had 
before it for consideration the following instruction: 
''The court instructs the jury that if they be-
lieve from a preponderance of the evidence that 
the defendant is liable to the plaintiff in this ac-
tion then in assessing damages against the de-
fendant, they may take into co~sider~tion the 
pain and suffering of the plaintiff, his !llent~l 
anguish, the bodily injury sustained by him, ~ts 
pecuniary loss, his loss of power and capacity 
for work and its effect upon his future, not how-
ever, in excess of $35,000, as to them may seem 
just and fair.'' 
It will be noted that the Virginia Court, from whose 
decision the railroad prosecuted its appeal, did not ·re-
quire the jury to find future pain and suffering by any 
degree of proof, but only required them to find such 
future pain and suffering by a preponderance of the 
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evidence. The court then in discussing the Virginia 
Court's decision stated as follows: 
"The supreme court expressed the view that 
the speculation of future results which the rail-
way company professed to apprehend was not 
left by the instruction for the jury to indulge, 
nor did the instruction commit the amount of 
damages to the conjecture of the jury independ-
ently of the evidence in the case. The contention 
made here was explicitly rejected, viz., that the 
instruction permitted the jury to take into con-
sideration the 'possible future physical effects 
from the injury, such as future suffering in the 
absence of evidence as to the probability of such.' 
The court remarked that it would be a strained 
construction of the language of the instruction 
'to hold that it referred to future suffering, and 
that damages not the proximate result of the in-
juries received were included under' it, and that, 
besides, such conclusion was precluded by an in-
struction given at the request of the railway com-
pany, which was 'that in order for the plaintiff 
to recover in this case he must prove by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence that the injuries he 
sustained were the direct and proximate result 
of the negligence of the defendant.' 
"The comment of the court is accurate and we 
can add nothing to it. The principle is established 
that when the evidence in a case shows that there 
will be future effects from an injury, an instruc-
tion which justifies an inclusion o,f them in an 
award of damages is not error. Washington & G. 
R. Co. v. Harmon (Washington & G. R. Co. v. 
Tobriner), 147 U. S. 571, 37 L. Ed. 284, 13 Sup. 
Ct. Rep. 557; McDermott v. Severe, 202 U. S. 600, 
50 L. Ed. 1162, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 709. 
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"It is also objected that the instruction 'al-
lowed the jury to indulge in speculation and con-
jecture; invited their attention to the sum of 
$35,000, and allowed the jury to give such sum as 
damages as to them might 'seem just and fair' 
without stating that the damages could be only 
such as were proved by the evidence to have proxi-
mately resulted from the negligent act complained 
of.' 
"The objection is untenable. As we have seen, 
the court explicitly enjoined upon the jury that 
there must be a proximate and causal relation be-
tween the damages and the negligence of the com-
pany, and the reference to the sum of $35,000 was 
a limitation of the amount stated in the declara-
tion. There could have been no misunderstanding 
of the purpose of the instruction. Norfolk & W. 
R. Co. v. Earnest, 229 U. S. 114, 119, 57 L. Ed. 
1096, 1100, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 654, Ann. Cas. 1914C, 
172." 
The instruction given to the jury in the case at bar 
was an instruction which has been approved by this 
Court in the case of Picino v. Utah-Apex Mining Co., 52 
Utah 338, 173 P. 900, 901, 902. The same contention was 
made by defendant in that case as is now made by the 
defendant in the case at bar. The instruction considered 
in the Picino case was as follows : 
'' 'If, under the evidence and the instructions 
given you by the court, your verdict is in favor 
?f th~ plaintiff, you will assess ills damages, and 
In doing so you have the right and should take 
~nto consideration his age and his earning capac-
Ity, before and after the injury the nature and 
extent of his injury, and wheth~r permanent or 
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not, the physical pain and mental anguish suf-
fered and endured and that he will probably here-
after endure bY reason and on account of said 
injury, the tim."e lost and that he will probably 
hereafter lose, as may appear from the evidence, 
by reason of and as a direct result of such injury, 
such expense, if any, as he will hereafter incur in 
the treatment of the injury, together with all the 
facts and circumstances in evidence in the case, 
and after doing so you will assess the damages at 
such sum as from the evidence you may deem 
proper, not exceeding the amount claimed by 
plaintiff in his complaint.' " 
The court stated defendant's contention as follows: 
"In support of this assignment appellants con-
cede that damages may be allowed in cases of 
this kind for future pain and suffering and for 
future loss of time; but they insist that the jury 
should be limited in awarding the damages for 
such future pain and suffering or loss of time ~s 
is reasonably certain from the evidence the plain-
tiff will suffer in the future. They object to the 
jury speculating as to the pain and suffering he 
will probably hereafter endure and the time he 
will probably hereafter lose * * *. '' 
In answering defendant's contention the court 
stated: 
'' * * * The rule invoked by appellants calls 
for a higher degree of certainty than is ordinarily 
required in civil cases. It is quite true the jury 
should not be permitted to indulge in mere specu-
lation in endeavoring to determine the rights of 
litigants. It does not follow, however, that be-
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cause they cannot demonstrate their conclusions 
with mathematical precision that therefore? their 
conclusions are invalid. Even in attempting to 
determine the damages already sustained in cases 
of this kind, jurors, in the very nature of things, 
are confronted with more or less uncertainty. 
That which is most likely, or that which is prob-
able in the light of all the evidence, is oftentimes 
the only practical guide. If a higher degree of 
certainty than this is required, it is manifest that 
great hardship and injustice will result in many 
cases. Of course, the probability here referred to 
should not be a mere conjectural probability, but 
one based on evidence. The jury, whose duty it 
is to ascertain and declare the truth from con-
flicting testimony, should accept that which is 
probably true as against that which is less prob-
able. In doing so the juror keeps within the law 
applicable to civil cases. He should accept that 
which he believes to be true, notwithstanding it 
may be more or less uncertain.'' 
The court quoted from 8 R. C. L. at page 544 as 
follows: 
" 'It is a well-settled general rule that, in 
assessing the amount of damages in an action 
for a personal injury, the jury may make an allow-
ance for the pain and suffering which the person 
injured is reasonably certain to undergo in the 
future in consequence of the injury, including also 
an aiiowance for mental suffering. Pain and suf-
fering which are merely possible and speculative 
are, of course, not to be considered. All that is 
required under this rule is that there be sufficient 
evidence from which the jury may fairly derive 
the conclusion that the chances that the plaintiff 
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will endure future pain and suffering preponder-
ate over those that he will not. Such preponder-
ance denotes probability or likelihood, and that is 
sufficient.' " 
Referring to this latter authority and the many other 
cases, including cases from the Federal courts, the Utah 
Supreme Court concluded as follows : 
''These authorities sustain the position of re-
spondent. The doctrine they enunciate is in har-
mony with our own views and with the practice 
generally which prevails in the trial of civil cases. 
If jurors are made to understand that their con--
clusions must be based upon substantial evidence 
actually introduced (and they generally are so 
instructed), we see no reason why a distinction 
should be made as to the degree of certainty be-
tween a case of this kind and any other ordinary 
civil case. Appellant's exception to the instruc-
tion is not sustained.'' 
Instructions which permit the jury to award dam-
ages for probable future pain and suffering have bee~ 
held not to allow the jury to give speculative damages 
and that such instructions are proper and the words 
''reasonably certain'' need not be used therein. See 
Coppinger v. Broderick, 37 Ariz. 473, 295 P. 780; Galla-
more v. City of Olympia, 43 Wash. 379, 75 P. 978. In this 
latter case the Court in discussing the similarity between 
the words "probable'' and "reasonably certain" stated 
as follows: 
" * * • The word 'probable' is defined in Web-
ster's International Dictionary as 'having more 
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evidence for than against; supported by evidence 
which inclines the mind to believe, but leaves 
some room for doubt; likely'; and in common 
acceptation the word implies, when applied to a 
condition which may be supposed beforehand, that 
we know facts enough about the condition sun-
posed to make us reasonably confident of it, or, ~t 
the least, that the evidence preponderates in its 
favor. In civil actions it is a general rule to 
which there are but few exceptions, that the fury 
may find according to the preponderance of the 
evidence. We know of no reason why an excep-
tion should be made in this instance, and we do 
not think the court's applying the term 'reason-
ably certain' to supposed future conditions meant 
any more than this, but that each of them would 
have approved an instruction to the effect that 
the jury might return damages for future pain 
and su If ering if they found by a rpreponderance 
of the evidence that such pain and suffering 
would ensue. However, the charge of the court 
is not without direct authority in its support. In 
Sedgwick on Damages (8th Ed.) vol. 1, p. 249, 
the author, speaking of prospective losses, after 
stating the rule to be that such losses must be 
reasonably certain to ensue, uses this language: 
'This 'reasonable certainty' does not mean abso-
lute certainty, but reasonable probability'; citing 
Griswold v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. R. Co., 115 N. Y. 
61, 21 N. E. 726, 12 Am. St. Rep. 775, and Feeney 
v. L. I. R. R. Co., 116 N. Y., 375, 22 N. E. 402, 5 
L. R. A. 544, where it was held not error to per-
mit answers to questions put to an expert medical 
witness conc~rni1_1g the. probability of the injured 
party suffering In the future from his injuries. 
In Hamilton v. Great Falls S. R. Co., 17 Mont. 
334, 42 Pac. 860, 43 Pac. 713, the court oaid : 'The 
court charged, among other things, that damages 
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could be awarded for 'such consequences as are 
reasonably likely to ensue in the future'; and 
again, 'plaintiff may recover for all pain and 
suffering which she has sustained, or in reason-
able probability will hereafter sustain,' etc. The 
appellant now contends that damages can only be 
awarded when it is rendered reasonably certain 
from the evidence that damages will inevitably 
and necessarily result from the original injury. 
In this case all testimony as to future disability 
consisted of expert medical opinions. Certainty 
of fut'ttre effects was impossible, and reasonable 
probabilities were necessarily the bases of the 
opinions expressed. Therefore to say that she 
could recover for suffering which she would in 
reasonable probability sustain was practically 
to say that she might recover for suffering which 
she was reasonably certain to sustain. The degree 
of proof would be the same in either case.' " 
The other cases cited by defendant under this point 
of its brief do not involve the giving of instructions 
similar to the one here criticized. 
In Southwest Brewery Co. v. Schmidt, 226 U. 8.163, 
33 S. Ct. 68, the criticism of the instruction had nothing 
to do with the lack or presence of the term ''reasonably 
certain". The Lindeman case was referred to but the 
court only stated that with regard to future pain the 
judge did not go beyond the conservative rule laid down 
in that case. It cannot be determined just what the 
court meant by this statement but there is nothing in 
the case which helps us in the determination of the ques-
tion here discussed. 
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In Daigneau v. Grand TTunk Ry. Co., 153 F. 593, a 
district judge wrote an o-pinion on a motion for a new 
trial wherein he allowed -plaintiff to either accept a 
remittitur or he would grant a new trial. He did not 
consider im;tructions which should be given to the jury 
on this subject. 
In Kennon v. Gilmer, 131 U. S. 22, 9 S. Ct. 696, the 
only question to which the Supreme Court addressed it-
self was whether or not there could be recovery for 
mental suffering. 
\Ve submit that under the foregoing authorities no 
error was committed by instructing the jury that plain-
tiff could recover for those damages which he would 
probably endure in the future. 
POINT V. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN PERMITTING 
PLAINTIFF TO TESTIFY TO TREATMENT PRESCRIBED 
BY DR. HINES. 
The plaintiff was permitted to testify that one of 
the doctors he consulted directed him to get a belt for 
his back (R. 115). Defendant contends that this testi-
mony is hearsay. There is no narrative statement of 
any facts contained in this direction of the doctor. 
The cases cited by defendant as sustaining its posi-
tion that this testimony was inadmissible are readily 
distinguishable from the case at bar. 
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In United States v. J!cCreary, 105 F. (2d) 297, the 
statements introduced in evidence were to the effect that 
the plaintiff was unable to work; that the doctor didn't 
think plaintiff could work because he hadn't been able 
to in the past and he could see no reason why he could 
in the future; that duodenal ulcers never heal; that the 
complaint that worried the doctor was the condition of 
plaintiff's heart; and that plaintiff had never been able· 
to do a day's work. These statements are nothing like 
those which were introduced in evidence here. The 
doctor here did not state as to what plaintiff had been 
able to do in the past or would be able to do in the fu-
ture. He merely stated that plaintiff should get a belt 
for his back (R. 115). 
In Bucher v. Equitable Life Assurance Society, 91 
Utah 179, 63 P. (2d) 604, the plaintiff introduced in evi-
dence statements made by doctors to him for the pur-
pose of fixing the time when the fact of permanent dis-
ability was made known to plaintiff so he could file due 
proof of his claim under an insurance policy. The court 
determined that this question was not material and 
further stated that the statements made by the doctors 
were hearsay. The statements there were to the effect 
that plaintiff was through and that he was not able to 
do anything, etc. 
The testimony of plaintiff here criticized related to 
the treatment he had sought and obtained for his in-
juries, the doctors he had consulted concerning his in-
juries and the things prescribed for their treatment. He 
testified to an examination by Dr. Delahanty and testi-
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fied without objection that this doctor gave him some 
little pills and said that plaintiff's trouble was all nerves. 
He then testified that Dr. Hines examined him and told 
him to get a belt for his back. 
Plaintiff was under a duty to obtain medical atten-
tion. 25 C. J. S. 508, Damages, Section 36. The testi-
mony that he consulted these doctors was admissible 
for this purpose. Then, as stated in 25 C. J. S. 800, 
Damages, Section 150, it was proper as bearing on the 
extent of his injuries to show that he received medical 
treatment. Testimony concerning what Dr. Hines pre-
scribed establishes that he received medical treatment 
for his injuries. 
In Townsend v. Keith, 34 Cal. App. 564, 168 P. 402, 
it was held proper for plaintiff to prove that he returned 
to a hospital a second time under the direction of his 
physician. 
\V e submit that these were mere statements by the 
doctors directing the plaintiff what he should do for 
his back and they are not in the nature of narrative 
statements and are not subject to the objection that they 
are hearsay. 
POINT VI. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN PERMITTING 
PLAINTIFF TO TESTIFY TO DIRECTIONS GIVEN HIM 
BY DEFENDANT'S TRAINMASTER'S CLERK, MERRILL. 
Defendant, in its brief at page 3, states that plain-
tiff went to Pueblo, Colorado, and contacted the claim 
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agent of the defendant. In its brief, under Point I, the 
defendant takes the position that the plaintiff was the 
one who sought defendant's claim agent for the pur-
pose of making a settlen1ent of his case. The record 
discloses that plaintiff was sent to the claim agent by 
defendant's trainmaster's clerk, l\lr. Merrill. Plaintiff 
so testified at R. 107. Defendant's claim agent testified 
on behalf of the defendant and stated that he was in-
formed by defendant's trainmaster's office at Salida 
that th~ plaintiff was coming to his office (R. 161). In 
preparation for this visit the claim agent called the 
doctor to determine whether or not plaintiff was physic-
ally qualified to work (R. 161). 
The foregoing testimony discloses that the train-
master's clerk certainly was the agent of the defendant 
and forwarded the information that plaintiff was coming 
to see the claim agent. This testimony was relevant to 
show the reason for plaintiff contacting the defendant. 
We submit that the testimony of the release from the 
board could not possibly have prejudiced defendant in 
this case. The record, as quoted by defendant in its brief 
on pages 27 and 28, discloses that the effect of the testi-
mony which was eventually obtained through the maze 
of questions and objections and comments by the Court 
was that plaintiff was sent to Pueblo to see the clain1 
agent, Sayger, by the trainmaster's clerk, Mr. Merrill. 
Here again the cases cited by defendant have nothing 
to do with the problem presented. Both of the cases 
cited by defendant involved contract actions and do not 
even remotely resemble the case at bar. 
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An examination of the record quoted by defendant 
discloses that the trial judge in effect ruled with the de-
fendant on its contention that reason for plaintiff's re · 
lease from the board was a conclusion and following the 
court's suggestion plaintiff was asked and stated what 
took place at his meeting with Merrill. This could not 
be error. A mere direction could not be hearsay. There 
was no narrative statement of fact. 
We submit that there was no prejudicial error in the 
rulings of the Court attacked and criticized under Point 
VI of defendant's brief. 
CONCLUSION 
We respectfully submit that the plaintiff was en-
titled to recover for the injuries which he received and 
that the verdict for $4,300.00 is an unassailed determina-
tion of the damages suffered by him as a result of his 
injuries. There were no errors committed in the trial of 
this case and in any event there certainly were no preju-
dicial errors committed by the· trial court. 
Section 104-14-7, Utah Code Annotated, 1943, pro-
vides as follows : 
''The court must in every stage of an action 
disregard any error or defect in the pleadings or 
proceedings which does not affect the substan-
tial rightR of the parties, and no judgment shall 
be reversed or affected by reason of such error 
or defect." 
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and Section 104-39-3, Utah Code Annotated, 1943, pro-
vides as follows : 
''No exception shall be regarded, unless the 
decision excepted to is material and prejudicial 
to the substantial rights of the party excepting.'' 
Under the foregoing authorities and arguments the 
judgment in this case should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RAWLINGS, WALLACE, 
BLA:CK & ROBERTS 
WAYNE L. BLACK 
DWIGHT L. KING 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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